Despite the Court’s finding against

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Besides widespread practices in China of torture and ill-treatment documented in various independent reports, the Court also cites the CAT committee about the common denial of the detainees’ access to lawyers under the State Secrets Law and the excessive dependence on self-confessions often extracted from torture as evidence in the criminal justice system (para. 79). We note that there are other institutionalized human rights problems in China that the Court could have cited, including de facto disappearance up to six months under the “retention in custody” measures in the 2018 Supervision Law and “Residential Surveillance at a Designated Place,” both of which have been commonly abused in the Chinese investigation process.

Liu’s extradition, it seems to suggest that country email list extraditions to China remain feasible with diplomatic assurances that could “offer in practice a sufficient guarantee” (para. 82) to protect the potential victims from ill-treatment. In line with the Court’s jurisprudence, we argue that such a guarantee should be premised on China’s credible, meaningful cooperation with supervision mechanisms as well as effective international monitoring of China’s promises.

Finally, given that the Court has decided in Liu’s favor on the ground of Art. 3 of the ECHR, it is understandable, yet regrettable, that the Court does not go further to consider the applicant’s claim about his rights to a fair trial under Art. 6, examining Chinese criminal procedure under the “flagrant denial of justice” test (see Al Nashiri v. Poland, no. 28761/11). While this question may seem unresolved, we believe that the Court’s grounds for relieving the burden of proof for individualized assessment in Liu would also exist in scenarios evaluating whether a “flagrant denial of justice” exists and therefore should be similarly applicable to the test in future cases.